The “Mongolian question” to Russian foreign policy

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ABSTRACT

The article analyzes the "Mongolian issue", which is one of the main directions of Russian foreign policy of the early 20th century. At the beginning of the 20th century, the international situation in the Far East region, the collision of imperialist forces, and the economic benefits through diplomatic efforts will be considered.

Keywords: Mongolia issue, Manjuria, Far East, buffer zone, colonization policy.

1. INTRODUCTION

On December 1, 1911, 4 tribes of Outer Mongolia issued an appeal proclaiming secession from China and the creation of an independent Mongol state. This event was the reason for the emergence of the so-called Mongolian issue, which became the subject of lively discussion in the political and public circles of Russia. The main directions of this controversy are reflected in historical literature, however, in our works, in our opinion, the position of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which made the final decision in this situation, is not adequately covered [1,p.109]. The task facing the foreign ministry was very difficult, because in the conditions of intensified international rivalry in the Far Eastern region at the beginning of the 20th century, ill-conceived actions could disrupt existing stability and lead to undesirable consequences. The relevance of studying the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia on the “Mongol issue” is also due to the fact that modern Chinese literature continues to be dominated by the assertion that modern Chinese literature continues to be dominated by the tsarist Russia's aggressive actions[2,p.72], despite the fact that in many studies, the position of the Russian Foreign Ministry on the Mongol issue at the beginning of the 20th century, concerning Russian-Mongolian relations, it was convincingly proved that until 1911 Russia pursued economic interests in Mongolia primarily and did not set the task of providing it with any kind of diplomatic assistance in creating autonomy, and, especially, in its separation from China. As noted in the preface to the publication of documents relating to Russian-Mongolian relations, before the beginning of the XX century. ... the king government did not have sufficient political and strategic incentives to step up its policy in this relatively provincial sector of the imperialist struggle[3,p.79]. The American researcher G. Fritters pointed to the limited nature of even the economic involvement of the Russian government in the fate of Mongolia in the second half of the 19th century[4,p.153]. In conditions aggravated in the late XIX - early XX centuries. international situation in the Far East, the official position of the Russian Foreign Ministry was to maintain a status quo in the region and the preservation of Outer Mongolia under the rule of China, but open and located towards Russia in economic terms. This stemmed from the general strategic line of Russian diplomacy, which was to maintain between Russia and China a system of intermediate provinces (Manchuria, Mongolia, Xinjiang), which have historical foundations for claiming independence, and are ethnically different from native China. According to the tsars strategists of that time, A.D. Voskresensky the state interests of Russia could be realized only through the interconnectedness of adjacent territories and the formation of an economic buffer zone under the control of Russia [5,p.212]. Thus, a strategic defense system was created against China, which was especially important in conditions of small population and poor economic development of adjacent Siberian territories. The colonization policy of Beijing in Mongolia at the beginning of the 20th century, threatened to break this system, as it brought the Chinese border closer to Russian borders, and this caused concern among diplomats and the military. In 1909, the head of the General Staff, General A.Z. Myshlaevsky in a letter to Minister of Foreign Affairs S.D. Sazonov pointed out that Chinese colonization is causing great damage to our economic interests, and in the event of an armed clash with China, it will change the strategic situation in a likely theater of war for us [6,p.9]. In Khalkha, Beijing's pursuit of an active colonization policy reinforced separatist sentiments among local princes. In July 1911, a meeting was held under the chairmanship of the Urgin Hutuhta, which decided to
appeal to Russia with a request for protection and to accept Khalkha under the protectorate of Russia[7,p.51].

For this purpose, a delegation of princes was sent to Petersburg with a hutuhta letter to the Russian emperor Nicholas II. On August 15, the delegation arrived in St. Petersburg, where it was received by the Foreign Minister, Neratov, and then Prime Minister P.A. Stolypin. At an interagency meeting on August 17, 1911, it was decided to provide Khalkha with diplomatic support and to make a statement to China that the reforms carried out in Mongolia are in conflict with ... statements about the desire of the Chinese government to maintain friendly relations with Russia[8,p.421]. At the same time, the arrived Mongolian delegation decided to explain the impracticability at the present moment of the complete deposition of China planned by the Mongols from China, but to promise our support in the fight against the Chinese for maintaining the original Khalkha system[9,p.37]. The delegation was accepted by P.A. Stolypin, who, having received a letter from Bogdo Hegen and four princes to the tsar, insistently advised "... not to take any action against the Chinese government" and promised that Russia "... will try to influence China in the sense of ending the intensified resettlement of Chinese and sending troops to Mongolia bordering with us[10,p.271]. The demarche of Russian diplomacy and the outbreak of the Xinhai revolution forced China to suspend military-political transformations in Mongolia, as was reported by the charge d'affaires in St. Petersburg in October 1911. [11,p.341] However, this could no longer stop the growing national liberation movement. On December 1, 1911, Outer Mongolia proclaimed itself an independent state and appealed to Russia for support. The Russian Foreign Ministry reacted to this with a statement of December 29, in which an official position was formulated on the Mongol issue. Not wanting to intervene in the struggle taking place in China and not fueling aggressive plans in Mongolia, the document emphasized.Russia, however, cannot but be interested in establishing a strong order in this region adjacent to Siberia, where there are large Russian commercial interests[12,p.339 ]. The position of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the "Mongol issue" at the beginning of the 20th century. To settle Mongolian Chinese relations, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs offered its mediation, which was to be built, on the one hand, on Mongolia's recognition of China's suzerainty, and on the other, on the official refusal of the Chinese side to carry out the planned military-political and economic reforms. In the event Beijing refuses to accept these conditions, Russia reserved the right to conduct business relations with the Mongolian government[13,p.401]. But, declaring its neutrality in the Mongolian Chinese conflict, the Russian government, nevertheless, did not remain indifferent to the events, as it concerned the geopolitical and strategic interests of Russia in the Far Eastern region. It was decided to start preparing a separate agreement with the government of Bogdo Gegen, which was supposed to strengthen the political and economic influence of Russia in Mongolia. At a meeting on August 2, 1912, the Council of Ministers concluded that a wait-and-see policy on the Mongolian issue is becoming dangerous and that the best solution at this time would be to conclude a bilateral diplomatic act between Russia and Khalkha, the essence of which would be to promise the Russian governments to defend the original Khalkha system and not to allow both the entry of Chinese troops into Mongolia and the Chinese colonizing it ... The political significance of such an act, said the Special Journal of the Council of Ministers, would very seriously, because the Chinese would be forced to reckon with the accomplished fact of a separate agreement between us and the Mongols, and these latter would be in responsible and, however, very beneficial for them relations with our country; finally, an agreement that would significantly complicate the intrigues of foreign powers against our position in Khalkha[14,p.49]. When discussing the draft Russian-Mongolian treaty, it turned out that the positions of the central departments are not the same. In particular, the ministers of finance, trade and industry insisted on the inclusion in the text of the treaty of a provision on the right of Russian citizens to acquire real estate in Mongolia without any restrictions. This demand was objected by the Foreign Ministry. Minister of Foreign Affairs S.D. Sazonov pointed out the danger of dramatic changes in the rights of Russian subjects in Mongolia, since this could cause opposition from the West European. A.V. Startsev Powers. In China, S.D. Sazonov, the most important political and commercial interests, both ours and foreign powers, intertwine and concentrate, and their mutual rivalry can be restrained in the framework of peaceful development only if the existing treaties and treaties are strictly observed." Therefore, he suggested that “the basis of the draft treaty with Mongolia be based on the idea of ensuring in it for Russia only those rights that Russian citizens already enjoy there by the strength of existing treaties” [15,p.179]. S.D. Sazonov recalled that, in accordance with the existing agreements, any advantage for Russian nationals in China automatically extended to nationals of other states, and therefore suggested concluding an agreement that substantially reproduces the resolution of St. Petersburg treatise of 1881 relating to Outer Mongolia. And since granting Russian citizens the right the widespread acquisition of real estate in Mongolia went beyond the scope of this agreement; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposed not to include data the first item in the projected Russian Mongolian agreement [16,p.7]. However, the above arguments did not change the views of the Minister of Finance V.N. Kokovtsova, and he continued to insist on the need to provide Russian citizens with the right to universal land
ownership in Mongolia. As a compromise, he proposed introducing into the text of the agreement a provision that allowed acquiring land only for the establishment of commercial and industrial institutions, and not for colonization or speculation [17,p.6].

Disagreements in determining the economic strategy of Russia in Mongolia led to the fact that a draft agreement with the Urgin government was prepared only by August, and was signed on October 21, 1912. It provided for the possibility of controlling Outer Mongolia by the national authorities, preventing Chinese colonization and the presence of Chinese troops here. The implementation of Russian economic interests was regulated by the protocol annexed to the agreement, which significantly expanded the rights of Russian citizens in commercial and industrial activities compared to the St. Petersburg agreement of 1881 [18,p.8]. The Russians gained the right to exploit mountain and forest wealth, open bank branches, and free float on the rivers and lakes of Mongolia. They were allowed to acquire land ownership. The position of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the "Mongol issue" at the beginning of the 20th century, land for the opening of trade and industrial institutions and rent them for farming. By agreement with the Mongolian authorities, Russian subjects could build bridges and establish mail. As in the St. Petersburg Treaty, they enjoyed the right to duty-free trade throughout the country and could make transactions in cash, on credit or in exchange for goods. However, unlike the previous order, neither the khoshuns nor government institutions were liable for the debts of private individuals. Disputes over transactions between Russians and Mongols should now be resolved by special mixed commissions composed of the Russian consul and representative of local authorities. At the same time, the Russian government received the right to appoint its consuls to those places that it sees fit [19,p.9]. The treaty on October 21, 1912 provoked vigorous protests from Beijing. In written appeals to the Russian Foreign Ministry, the Chinese government emphasized that Mongolia is an integral part of China and does not have the right to conclude any international agreements. Therefore, it insisted on the annulment of the signed documents. As a result of diplomatic meetings and lively correspondence, which lasted almost a year, the parties came to a compromise for the one fixed in the Russian-Chinese declaration on October 23, 1913. In accordance with this document, Russia recognized the overlord rights of China, and China, in turn, recognized the autonomy of Mongolia. As for the scope of authority of the Urgin government, this issue should have been resolved as a result of the Russian-Chinese-Mongolian negotiations, which it was decided to hold in Kyakhta [20,p.74].

At the upcoming negotiations, the Russian delegation faced a very difficult task: without upsetting the existing balance of power in the far eastern region, to achieve a dominant position in Outer Mongolia, which continued to remain, according to the Russian-Chinese declaration of 1913, part of China. In preparation for the negotiations, St. Petersburg took measures encouraging Mongolia to follow in the wake of Russian politics. An important role in this regard was to be played by the visit to Russia by the Prime Minister of the Mongolian government, Sain Noyon Khan Namnam Surena. This visit took place at the end of 1913, and its main goal was to obtain the military and financial A.V. The elders help, which was necessary for the Urgin government to continue military operations in Barg and Inner Mongolia with the aim of joining Khalkha. Russian politicians have repeatedly opposed the ambitious plans of the Urgin rulers. In conversations with Sayn Noyon Khan S.D. Sazonov persistently pointed out to him that "the hopes of his government were impossible to achieve the unification of all the Mongols into one state and the recognition of independence by the powers." The main task of the government at this stage, in his opinion, was the creation of a "strong Mongol state, which can only be the result of many years of hard internal work." It was for these purposes that the Russian government was ready to grant a loan of 3 million rubles to Mongolia. (The first loan of 2 million rubles was granted to Mongolia in January 1913). At the meeting of the Mongolian prime minister with V.N. Kokovtsov talked about the use of the judiciary exclusively for enterprises that are inclined towards the cultural development and enrichment of Mongolia [21,p.135]. In addition to credit, the Russian government assumed assistance in organizing the state economy, finance, and customs services of Mongolia, because without this, the alleged wide autonomy of Khalkha could not have taken place. Fearing that the young Mongolian government would not be able to use the loans received to the maximum benefit, the Ministry of Finance sent adviser S.A. to Urga in 1914. Kozina, who, in addition to monitoring the spending of the loan, was supposed to provide financial and technical assistance in organizing the state economy, taxes and customs. To solve these problems, the Office of the Russian Advisor was formed, for work in which S.A. Kozin invited specialists from Russia. Employees of the Department established some order in the organization of public finances, in particular, the budget of the Ministry of Finance was drawn up, which made it possible to control revenues and expenses. Assistant S.A. Kozina P.A. Witte in 1915-1916 conducted a preliminary statistical and economic study of the country, and in 1918 - the first census of population and livestock in the history of Mongolia. In addition, at the insistence of S.A. Kozina, the Government established the State Property Management, the purpose of which was to receive treasury income from state property, to establish the right one, I'm not depleting it. The position of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the "Mongol issue" at the beginning of the 20th century. their use, as well as the expansion of the
receivables, registration, proper assessment and withdrawal in kind of receivables with the preparation of plans, supervision and protection on the ground [22,p.126]. In 1914, at the initiative of a diplomatic agent in Urga, A.Ya. Miller, the Russian side began negotiations to conclude an agreement on railway construction in Mongolia. In the instructions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs A.Ya. Miller was advised not to insist on the exclusive right of Russia to build railways in Outer Mongolia, but actually secure for us that right, which follows from the natural geographical and commercial gravity of autonomous Mongolia to our Siberian possessions and to our rail network serving them [23,p.184]. On October 28, 1914, such an agreement was signed. In this document, Russia assumed obligations to provide all third-party assistance in the construction of railways, and Mongolia was not supposed to begin railway construction or issue concessions without agreement with the Russian side [24,p.65].

Despite some successes achieved in resolving the international legal aspect of the Mongolian issue, the Russian government was aware that the signed documents did not guarantee Russian entrepreneurs absolute dominance in the Mongolian market. The search for ways and means to achieve this goal was complicated by the lack of unity in the highest government circles. The Ministry of Trade and Industry was under strong pressure from the side of entrepreneurs who believed that the trade protocol of the Urgin Treaty did not provide guarantees for their successful activity in Mongolia. In particular, the merchants advocated raising customs tariffs on goods that arrived in Mongolia from China. This is the question, according to the Minister of Trade and Industry S.I. Timashev, seems extremely important, and he is in a letter to S. D. Sazonov was suggested to establish a uniform, coordinated view of the government on the real question [25,p.281]. In response to these requirements S.I. Sazonov in a letter to S.I. Timashev of February 17, 1914 emphasized that for Russian trade there is a preferential provision, beyond which, in terms of benefits, there is nowhere to go if you do not resort to bonuses for Russian export to Mongolia [26,p.51]. Unlike Russian goods imported into Mongolia duty-free, foreign products were taxed at a rate of 12.5% of their value. And therefore, the minister believed, attempts to raise the customs tariff on the Mongolian-Chinese border were contrary to the principle of equal opportunities in China and would inevitably provoke protests from the Western powers that "they would compromise our position on the Mongolian issue and force us to make concessions that could be avoided if not openly affect the interests of powers [27,p.88]. In addition to regulating customs duties, in order to strengthen Russia's economic influence in Mongolia, a whole range of measures was required: expanding the range of Russian exports, reducing overhead and transportation costs for the delivery of goods, improving communications, organizing credit support for merchants, etc. An important role in the development of trade and economic relations with Mongolia was to play the Far Eastern Department of the Russian Export Chamber, organized in March 1911, which was conceived as a representative body uniting Russian entrepreneurs working in the countries of the Far East. As emphasized by its leader A.N. Arkady Petrov, the Far East department is a neutral ground on which large and small businessmen could come together, equally interested in the prosperity of Russian trade, the growth of their own interests in the countries of the Far East, especially in the regions of China and Japan adjacent to Russia [28,p.69].

Mongolia, the Far Eastern Department paid special attention. So, in 1912, out of 136 reports and messages heard at its meetings, 58 (42.6%) were devoted to issues of Russian-Mongolian trade. Under the department, several commissions were created to prepare documents and decisions on this issue (a commission to develop the charter of the Russian-Mongolian joint-stock company, a commission to study tariff and customs rates, etc.) [29,p.126]. Thus, by the time the tripartite negotiations began, Russia had significantly strengthened its positions in Outer Mongolia, and the most important task of Russian diplomacy at the conference in Kyakhta was to secure them in the relevant documents. The Kyakhtinsky conference began its work on August 26, 1914 and lasted for eight months. Only by the end of May 1915 it was finally possible to agree on the entire text of the Russian-Chinese-Mongolian agreement. The signed document was a com. The position of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the "Mongol issue" at the beginning of the 20th century. Promissory solution to the Mongolian issue. Outer Mongolia recognized the sovereignty of China, while Russia and China recognized its autonomy. The Urgin government received the exclusive right to manage all matters of internal administration, and also could conclude international treaties and agreements relating to trade and industry. Russia and China pledged not to interfere in the internal affairs of Autonomous Mongolia. The 21st article of the agreement was very important for Russia, which fully recognized the trade protocol of the Urginsky agreement on October 21, 1912, which gave Russian citizens wide opportunities for doing business.

4. CONCLUSION

Thus, the Russian delegation at the Kyakhta negotiations as a whole solved the tasks assigned to it. Russia legislatively consolidated its economic advantages in Outer Mongolia, although it did not manage to completely monopolize the Mongolian market, as the business circles of European Russia desired. At the same time, the Kyakhta agreement did not violate the existing balance of power in the Far Eastern
region and did not affect the interests of Western European powers in China. As for the historical fate of Mongolia, here the actions of Russia were objectively progressive in nature. Russia prevented widespread Chinese colonization, which aimed at the complete assimilation of the Mongols, contributed to the restoration of Mongolian statehood in the form of a theocratic monarchy, and did not allow it to happen in 1912–1915. the occupation of Khalkhi by China, which did not want to hear about Mongol autonomy, and even more - independence. In addition, as S.G. Luzyanin, ... King of Russia supported more progressively minded secular princes who forced the clerical group of high lamas to make close economic and political rapprochement with Russia, thereby strengthening Mongolia’s process of carrying out social and economic reforms, reorganizing the state administrative apparatus, and democratizing the Mongolian parliament (Khurala), the creation of the army [30,p.108]. As for the complete independence of Mongolia, then, as EA convincingly proved in his monograph Belov, and as the facts discussed above testify, this question was not raised by Russian politicians, and the allegations that Petersburg did not fulfill its promises do not correspond to real events [31,p.32]. Russia, recognizing the Mongols' desire for national independence as fair, believed that the level of their socio-economic and political development was insufficient for the formation of a sovereign state.

REFERENCES
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21. Ibid.