From Corruption to State Capture: Assessing the Relevance of Anti-Corruption Institutions in Ghana
Keywords:
Anti- Corruption, Corruption, State Capture Relevance, Institution, Ghana
Abstract
Over the course of time, corruption has evolved into a pervasive force that consistently undermines the moral fabric of society. It is widely acknowledged as the foremost impediment to a nation's progress, particularly in the realms of poverty alleviation and the reduction of inequality. This is especially true especially for developing countries like Ghana. The insidious and escalating nature of corruption renders it highly contagious across all sectors of society, thereby necessitating a thorough assessment of the phenomenon. Hence, the paper holistically, examined the issue of corruption specifically on the topic “from corruption to state capture, the relevance of anti- corruption institution”. Salient issues that surfaced included an overview of corruption and state capture, some anti-corruption institutions and their role as well as the challenges encountered by these anti-corruption institutions in performing their functions as well astheir role and significance in solving a state capture level of corruption through informal strategies like Co-optation, Control and Camouflage. The paper adopted a qualitative methodology for flexibility and broader data. Out of this a conclusion was drawn and some recommendations made for policy makers attention and action.
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2. Andersson, S. and Anechiarico, F. (2019). Corruption and Corruption Control: Democracy in the Balance. Available at http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/linneebooks/detail.action?docID=5775148. (Accessed on F
3. Dialoke, I., Ukah, F. & Kanu, P.A. (2020). Leadership, Corruption and Governance: The Nigerian Experience. International Journal of Innovative Development and Policy Studies 8(4):15-2.
4. Blundo, G. and Olivier de Sardan, J.P.(2006), “Everyday Corruption and the State. Citizens & Public Officials in Africa”, London/New York: Zed Books.
5. AfriCOG. (2020) ‘Highway Robbery: “Budgeted Corruption” as State Capture. A case study of infrastructure spending under the Jubilee Administration’, available from https://africog.org/highway-robbery-budgeted-corruption-as-state-capture-a-case-study-of-infrastructure-spending-under-the-jubilee-administration/
6. Fazekas, M., & Tóth, I. J. (2016) ‘From Corruption to State Capture’ Political Research Quarterly 69(2): 320-34. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912916639137
7. Cheeseman, N., Lynch, G. and Willis, J. 2016.: Ghana shows a troubling willingness to acceptpolitical corruption, our recent survey shows.Washington Post.
8. Boateng, C. 2018. Ghana United against CorruptionNational Anti-Corruption Action. Plan. Graphic Online.
9. BBC News. 2018. Ghana Country Profile. Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2018. Ghana Country Report.
10. AfriCOG. (2020) ‘Highway Robbery: “Budgeted Corruption” as State Capture. A case study of infrastructure spending under the Jubilee Administration’, available fromhttps://africog.org/highway-robbery-budgeted-corruption-as-state-capture-a-case-study-of-infrastructure-spending-under-the-jubilee-administration/
11. Kupferschmidt, D. 2009. Illicit Political Financing and State Capture, InternationalIDEA.http://www.idea.int/resources/analysis/upload/IDEA_Inlaga _low.pdf
12. Doig A.,Watt D., and Williams R. (2007), Why do Developing Country Anti-Corruption Commissions Fail to Deal with Corruption ?Understanding the three dilemmas of organizational development, performance expectation, and donor and government cycles, Public Admin. Dev,27:251- 259.doi:10.1002/pad.452
13. Bozóki, A. (2012) ‘Occupy the State: The Orbán Regime in Hungary’, Debatte: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe 19(3): 649-63. https://doi.org/10.1080/0965156x.2012.703415
14. Monks. 2012. The Corporate Capture of the United States, The Harvard School of Law Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation. https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/01/05/thecorporate-capture-of-the-united-states/
15. Zinnbauer, D. 2009. Corrupting the rules of the game: from legitimate lobbying to capturing regulations and policies in Global Corruption Report: Corruption and the Private Sector, Transparency International.
16. Freeland, C. (2000) Sale of the century: the inside story of the second Russian revolution: Little, Brown.
17. Godinho, C., & Hermanus, L. (2018) ‘(Re)conceptualising State Capture - With a Case Study of South African Power Company Eskom’, Paper prepared for the Public Affairs Research Institute’s State Capture and Its Aftermath: Building Responsiveness Through State Reform, 22 -24 October 2018, Johannesburg.
18. Innes, A. (2014) ‘The Political Economy of State Capture in Central Europe’ Journal of Common Market Studies 52(1): 88-104. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12079
19. Jensen, N. (2002) ‘Economic reform, state capture and international investment in transition economies’ Journal of International Development 14:973-77. https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.937
20. Khan, M., Andreoni, A., & Roy, P. (2019) ‘Anti-corruption in adverse contexts: strategies for improving implementation’, available from https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/32530/1/ACE-WorkingPaper013-AntiCorruptionAdverseContexts-Text-190909.pdf
21. Khan, M., Andreoni, A., & Roy, P. (2019) ‘Anti-corruption in adverse contexts: strategies for improving implementation’, available from https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/32530/1/ACE-WorkingPaper013-AntiCorruptionAdverseContexts-Text-190909.pdf
22. Khwaja, A. I., & Mian, A. (2005) ‘Do lenders favor politically connected firms? Rent provision in an emerging financial market’ The Quarterly Journal of Economics 120(4): 1371-1411.
23. Lessig, L. (2012) Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress and a Plan to Stop It: Twelve.
24. Loayza, N., Rigolini, J., & Llorente, G. (2012) ‘Do middle classes bring about institutional reforms?’ Economics Letters 116(3): 440-44. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.013
25. Magyar, B. (2016) Post-Communist Mafia State: The Case of Hungary, Budapest: CEU Press.
26. Margetts, H., & Hood, C. (Eds.). (2012) Paradoxes of modernization: unintended consequences of public policy reform, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
27. Martin, J. P. (2020) ‘Resource Reallocation and Ambiguous Economic Performance in a Captured State – the Case of Hungary’, in D. Piroska & M. Rosta, eds., Systems, Institutions, and Values in East and West: Engaging with János Kornai's Scholarship, 173-202 Budapest, Hungary: Central European University Press.
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29. Mavrogordatos, G. T. (1997) ‘From Traditional Clientelism to Machine Politics: the Impact of PASOK Populism in Greece’, South European Society and Politics 2(3): 1-26. https://doi.org/10.1080/13608749708539516
30. Ehlum, H., Moene, K. and Torvik, R., (2006) ‘Institutions and the resource curse’, The Economic Journal 116(508): 1-20.
31. Moyo, L. (2019) ‘Data Journalism and the Panama Papers: New Horizons for Investigative Journalism in Africa’, in B. Mutsvairo, S. Bebawi, & E. Borges-Rey, eds., Data Journalism in the Global South: Palgrave Macmillan.
32. Doig A. Watt D., and Williams R. (2007), Why do Developing Country Anti-Corruption Commissions Fail to Deal with Corruption ?Understanding the three dilemmas of organizational development, performance expectation, and donor and government cycles, Public Admin. Dev,27:251- 259.doi:10.1002/pad.452
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34. GACC. 2018. About us Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition.www.gacc.com
35. Anti-Corruption Authorities (ACA). 2018. Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ). CHRAJ. 2018. About Us.
36. Tenkorang, E. 2018. Amidu Sworn in As Ghana's First Special Prosecutor – citifmonline.com. Citi FM Online.
37. Osei-Amoako, Y. 2018. Reflections on Ghana’s Office of the Special Prosecutor. Ghana Web.
38. Okello, C. 2018. High Hopes in Ghana after New Anti-Corruption Tsar Named. RFI.
39. Ghana Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (GHEITI). (2018). About EITI in Ghana. Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII). 2018. About GII.
40. Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII). 2018. About
41. GII. Ghana News Agency. 2018. “When Greed and Corruption Become the Norm”. Ghana Web. 2017
42. Mauro, P. (1995) ‘Corruption and growth’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(3): 681-712.
43. Dupuy, K. 2017. Corruption and Elite Capture of Mining Community Development Funds in Ghana and Sierra Leone. Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI).
44. Transparency International. 2012. Money, Politics, Power: Corruption Risks in Europe. National Integrity System. http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/pub/money_politics _and_power_corruption_risks_in_europe
45. Cingano, F., & Pinotti, P. (2013) ‘Politicians at work: The private returns and social costs of political connections’, Journal of the European Economic Association 11(2): 433-65.
46. Global Integrity (2009). Global Integrity ReportGhana.Accessed at Url:http/report.globalintegrity. org/Ghana /2009
47. Blundo, G. and Olivier de Sardan, J.P.(2006), “Everyday Corruption and the State. Citizens & Public Officials in Africa”, London/New York: Zed Books.
48. Johnston, M. (2005) Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, power and Democracy: Cambridge University Press.
49. Baez-Camargo and Ledeneva (2017) Character education and gifted children. High Ability Studies, 20(2), 131-142.
50. Dua-Agyeman (2015) Review Series-
Published
2023-08-03
How to Cite
Donpaala, S. D., & Mohammed, A.-R. (2023). From Corruption to State Capture: Assessing the Relevance of Anti-Corruption Institutions in Ghana. International Journal on Economics, Finance and Sustainable Development, 5(7), 176-193. Retrieved from https://journals.researchparks.org/index.php/IJEFSD/article/view/4665
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